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The constitutional rights of minors are continually being ex-
panded and in many areas are approaching those recognized for
adults.' This expansion follows judicial recognition that minors as
well as adults are persons under the Constitution entitled to constitu-
tional rights and protections. Seeking even greater constitutional
recognition, minors have recently attacked the constitutionality of
state statutes that allow parents to institutionalize their children for
mental health treatment.2 The challenge rests upon the assertion
that children possess liberty interests in the institutionalization proc-
ess deserving of constitutional protection.
In Bartley v. Kremens3 a three-judge court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania invalidated Pennsylvania's juvenile commit-
ment statute and mandated due process protections similar to those
afforded to adults in involuntary commitment proceedings. This
comment examines the various interests involved in the area of juve-
nile commitments and suggests reasons why the Constitution does
not require states to afford minors the full due process protections
ordered by the Bartley court.
II. Pennsylvania's Mental Health Admission Procedures-A
Continuing Constitutional Battle
A. Bartley v. Kremens- The Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 19665
Many states entrust parents and psychiatrists with the decision
1. See notes 49-63 and accompanying text infra.
2. See J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court), prob.juris.
noted 431 U.S. 936 (1977); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (three-judge
court); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (three-judge court).
3. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded 431 U.S. 119 (1976), rein-
stated sub nom., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30
(E.D.Pa. 1978) (three-judge court), prob. juris noted June 19, 1978 (argument heard Oct. 10,
1978).
4. Id. (hereinafter subsequent history will be omitted and citations will refer to the
particular opinion in question).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704 (Purdon 1969) [hereinafter referred to as the 1966
Act].
to authorize institutionalization of minors who need mental health
treatment.6 A minor's commitment is effectuated without the sub-
stantial procedural protections afforded to adults in similar proceed-
ings.7 Pennsylvania, for example, allows a parent to initiate the
institutionalization of his child by subjecting the child to a psychiat-
ric evaluation to determine whether he is mentally ill and requires
inpatient psychiatric treatment. After the child's examination, if
both the parent and doctor concur in his need for institutionaliza-
tion, the child is admitted and the appropriate treatment begins.
In Bartley several Pennsylvania juveniles instituted a class ac-
tion,8 which attacked the constitutionality of the state procedures
under which they were committed to state mental institutions9 on
both due process and equal protection grounds.'° Although prior to
admission each plaintiff had received a psychiatric evaluation to in-
sure the necessity of institutional treatment," plaintiffs asserted that
6. See 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 130, § 334; IDAHO CODE §§ 66-318, 66-320 (1973 &
Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 202 A.020 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 123, §§ 10, 11
(West 1969 & Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.115 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 433A.140, 433A.560 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:11 (1978); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-46 (West 1964 & Supp. 1978); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13 (McKinney 1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 184 (West 1951 & Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.220 (1977);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-601 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-29 (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.10 (West 1957 & Supp. 1978); WYo. STAT. § 25-3-106 (1977).
7. See note 149 infra.
8. The class consisted of "all persons eighteen years of age or younger who have been,
are, or may be admitted or committed to mental health facilities in Pennsylvania under the
[1966 Act]." Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court).
The action was instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which provides,
Every person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Maintaining an action under this section depends on a showing of sufficient "state action" in
the challenged activity. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
9. The juveniles were admitted to the state institutions pursuant to §§ 4402 and 4403 of
the 1966 Act. Section 4402 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Application for voluntary admission to a facility for examination, treatment and
care may be made by:
(1) Any person over eighteen years of age.
(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to
be admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger.
Section 4403 authorized persons identical to those in § 4402 to initiate admission, even
though this section is entitled "voluntary commitment." In Bartley no distinction was made
between these two sections, and this comment uses the words "admitted" and "committed"
interchangeably. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 122 n.2 (1977).
10. Since the court disposed of the case on due process grounds, it did not address plain-
tiffs' equal protection arguments, which were founded upon the disparate treatment between
minors and adults in the admission process. Plaintiffs also argued that they were denied equal
protection because only persons over eighteen could voluntarily admit or commit themselves
to an institution. The court dismissed this argument for lack of standing since plaintiffs did not
allege any attempt or desire to commit themselves. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039,
1054 n.27 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court).
II. Sections 4402 and 4403 of the 1966 Act require the director of the admitting facility
to "cause an examination" to be made to determine whether care or observation is necessary
prior to admitting the juvenile.
additional protection was necessary to prevent the erroneous institu-
tionalization of children who are not mentally ill.'" They argued
that minors were entitled to substantial due process safeguards
before commitment. '
3
While the action was pending, the Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare promulgated regulations that substantially increased
the procedural protections afforded minors both prior to and after
admission to mental health facilities.' 4 The regulations required that
two independent psychiatric evaluations concur in the need for insti-
tutionalization before the juvenile could be hospitalized.' 5 Further-
more, juveniles age thirteen or older who objected to remaining at
the institution were afforded a judicial hearing complete with full
due process protection.' 6
The defendants argued that the purpose of the 1966 Act was to
treat children suffering from mental illness, rather than to punish
them for engaging in illegal behavior, and therefore, the require-
ments of due process did not apply.'7 Alternatively, defendants ar-
gued that the 1966 Act and its complementary regulations 8
adequately protected a minor's constitutional rights. Finally, de-
fendants contended that parents waive a minor's due process rights
by initiating the institutionalization process. 19
12. Anyone confined in a mental institution can attack his confinement through habeas
corpus. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4426 (Purdon 1969). At oral argument before the United
States Supreme Court on Oct. 10, 1978, Mr. Justice Marshall commented that habeas corpus is
a noneffective remedy against erroneous confinement for those children too young to under-
stand its availability or use. At no time, however, have any of the plaintiffs challenged the
necessity of their confinement, although some have completed their treatment and have been
discharged, and they have all had the benefit of counsel at least since the commencement of
the suit. Brief for Appellants, at 35 n.21, Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Wel-
fare, NO. 77-1715 (U.S. filed Aug. 3, 1978).
13. The rights demanded by plaintiffs are as follows: (1) right to notice; (2) right to a pre-
commitment hearing; (3) right to counsel and if indigent, the right to appointment of counsel;
(4) right to present evidence on their own behalf; (5) right to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments; (6) right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (7) right to a judicial determination
regarding commitment; (8) right to be committed only upon a decision that they need treat-
ment, care, or observation. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (E.D. Pa. 1975)(three-
judge court). The last right demanded by plaintiffs appears to be guaranteed by the 1966 Act,
supra note 5, at §§ 4402(b), 4403(b).
14. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1042-43 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge
court).
15. Id For the mentally retarded, one of the evaluations may be a medical or psycholog-
ical evaluation conducted by a pediatrician, general physician or psychiatrist. Id.
16. Id. Plaintiffs argued that the constitutionality of the 1966 Act was not saved by the
supplementing regulations because the regulations did not apply to children under thirteen,
require a pre-commitment hearing, nor designate a time by which a post-commitment hearing
must be held. Id. at 1042-43.
17. The court rejected the argument that the necessity of due process requirements de-
pends upon whether the confinement is for punative or benevolent purposes. Other courts
have rejected similar arguments. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Hereford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
18. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1044-45 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court).
19. The court held that because a conflict of interest between the parent and the child in
The Bartley court held that the Pennsylvania commitment pro-
cedures were unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement.2 0
Specifically, the court held that minors are entitled to the following
due process protections prior to institutionalization: (1) a probable
cause hearing within seventy-two hours of commitment; (2) a post-
commitment hearing within two weeks; (3) written notice of the
hearing; (4) counsel at all significant stages of the commitment proc-
ess and, if indigent, the right to appointment of free counsel; (5) the
right to be present at all commitment hearings; (6) a finding by clear
and convincing proof that they are in need of institutionalzation; and
(7) the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them
and to offer evidence in their own behalf.2 ' Additionally, the court
ordered that Pennsylvania either release all minors in institutions or
recommit them employing the newly mandated procedures.2 2
B. The Supreme Court Intervenes-Pennsylvania Enacts the Mental
Health Procedures Act
The United States Supreme Court, upon petition by the defend-
ants, granted a stay in the implementation of the district court's or-
der.2 3 Shortly thereafter, probable jurisdiction was noted and
argument was heard by the Court,24 but prior to a decision, Penn-
sylvania enacted the Mental Health Procedures Act, 5 which re-
pealed the challenged sections of the 1966 Act except those sections
relating to the mentally retarded.26 Under the 1976 Act parents can
no longer institutionalize children over fourteen.27 Minors over
fourteen can both admit themselves and later withdraw from treat-
the institutionalization decision is possible, parents cannot waive their child's due process
rights. The court stated, "[l1f we could find that in all instances parents act in the best interest
of their children, we might also find that parents may waive constitutional rights of their chil-
dren." Id at 1047. For a mild criticism of discussing the issue in terms of waiver, see Com-
ment, Due Process Limitations on Parental Rights to Commit Children to Mental Institutions, 48
U. COLo. L. REV. 235 (1977), wherein the author states that the issue is whether "parental
family rights precluded inquiry into the child's constitutional rights when parents are acting on
the child's behalf." Id at 254.
20. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1053-54 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court).
21. Id at 1053.
22. Bartley v. Kremens, No. 72-2272 (final order of Nov. 17, 1975).
23. Kremens v. Bartley, 423 U.S. 1028 (1975).
24. Argument was heard on Dec. 1, 1976.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-503 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1978) [hereinafter referred
to as the 1976 Act].
26. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (three-judge court).
27. Section 7201 of the 1976 Act, supra note 25, provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any person 14 years of age or over who believes that he is in need of treatment
and substantially understands the nature of voluntary commitment may submit him-
self to examination and treatment under this act, provided that the decision to do so
is made voluntarily. A parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to a
child less than 14 years of age may subject such child to examination and treatment
under this act, and in so doing shall be deemed to be acting for the child.
ment by giving written notice.28 Children under fourteen, however,
can only be admitted29 to an institution or withdrawn from it upon
application by their parent or guardian.3" Further protection is af-
forded by a treatment plan that must be formulated for each patient
within three days of admission.3' The plan must also be re-evalu-
ated, at least every thirty days, and the patient must be discharged if
treatment is no longer appropriate.32 The 1976 Act also allows any
"responsible" person who believes that a child's treatment is either
no longer necessary or should be administered in a less restrictive
setting33 to file a petition in juvenile court requesting withdrawal of
the patient from treatment or modification of the treatment.34 After
such a petition is filed, an attorney is appointed to represent the child
and a full judicial hearing must follow.
35
In light of the passage of the 1976 Act, the Supreme Court va-
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7206(a) (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1978). In certain situations
release may be delayed for up to three days provided that the patient had agreed to the delay
in writing at the time of admission. Id
29. Id § 7201.
30. Id § 7206(b).
31. Id § 7205. The plan must be formulated by a "treatment team" and become part of
the patient's record. "The treatment plan shall state whether inpatient treatment is considered
necessary, and what restraints or restrictions, if any, will be administered, and shall set forth
the bases for such conclusions." Id.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7108 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1978) provides the following:
(a) Reexamination and Review. Every person who is in treatment under this act
shall be examined by a treatment team and his treatment plan reviewed not less than
once in every 30 days.
(b) Redisposition. On the basis of reexamination and review, the treatment team
may either authorize continuation of the existing treatment plan if appropriate, for-
mulate a new individualized treatment plan, or recommend to the director the dis-
charge of the person. A person shall not remain in treatment or under any particular
mode of treatment for longer than such treatment is necessary and appropriate to his
needs.
(c) Record of Reexamination and Review. The treatment team responsible for
the treatment plan shall maintain a record of each reexamination and review under
this section for each person in treatment to include:
(I) a report of the reexamination, including a diagnosis and prognosis;
(2) a brief description of the treatment provided to the person during the period
preceding the reexamination and the results of that treatment;
(3) a statement of the reason for discharge or for continued treatment;
(4) an individualized treatment plan for the next period, if any;
(5) a statement of the reasons that such treatment plan imposes the least restric-
tive alternative consistent with adequate treatment of his condition; and
(6) a certification that the adequate treatment recommended is available and will
be afforded in the treatment program.
33. For a discussion of the "least restrictive alternative" concept, see Halderman v. Penn-
hurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), appealdocketed, No. 78-1490
(3d Cir. April 13, 1978); J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court),
prob. juris noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7206(b). At oral argument before the Supreme Court on
Oct. 10, 1978, Mr. Justice Marshall commented that young children rarely have friends mature
enough to file a petition in court challenging the propriety of inpatient treatment. In response,
Deputy Attorney General, Norman Watkins, arguing for Pennsylvania, pointed out that plain-
tiffs apparently had such a friend (the attorney who filed the action on their behalf).
35. Id
cated the district court's order and remanded the case for further
consideration. 36  The Court emphasized to the district court that
careful attention must be paid to the differences between the interests
of older and younger juveniles. The Court observed,
This distinction between older and younger juveniles, recog-
nized by state administrative authorities (and later by the Penn-
sylvania Legislature in its enactment of the 1976 Act), emphasizes
the very possible differences in the interests of the older juveniles
and the younger juveniles. Separate counsel for the younger
juveniles might well have concluded that it would not have been
in the best interests of their clients to press for the requirement of
an automatic pre-commitment hearing, because of the possibility
that such a hearing with its propensity to pit parent against child
might actually be antithetical to the best interest of the younger
juveniles.37
C. Bartley Revisited38
On remand,39 the district court found "no significant differences
between older and younger mentally retarded juveniles for due proc-
ess purposes."4 The court, however, failed to analyze possible dif-
ferences between the interests of older and younger mentally ill
juveniles within the plaintiff class,4 which implied that no differ-
ences exist.42 Moreover, while the court agreed with the Supreme
Court that significant differences do exist between the mentally ill
and the mentally retarded, the court held that the possibility of erro-
36. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the 1976 Act
mooted the named plaintiffs' claims because all of the named plaintiffs were over fourteen and,
therefore, were entitled to full due process protections. Id. at 129. The Court also held that the
1976 Act so sufficiently fragmented the entire class that a decision on the merits would be
improper. Id at 132.
37. 431 U.S. at 135. Additionally, the Court noted that careful attention should be paid
to the differences between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. Id
38. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (three-judge court).
39. A new plaintiff class was certified consisting of "all juveniles under the age of four-
teen who are subject to inpatient treatment under Article II of the 1976 Act," id., at 41, and
"mentally retarded juveniles age eighteen or younger," id., at 42. The district court also certi-
fied a class of defendants consisting of the "directors of all mental health facilities in Penn-
sylvania which are subject to regulation by the defendant Secretary of Public Welfare." Id., at
40 n.37. As a result of the broadness of the district court's class certification, the defendant
class includes the "directors of private facilities, community-based group homes and mental
health centers, as well as private schools 'approved' to dispense mental health or mental retar-
dation therapy." Brief for Appellants at 19 n.6, Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub.
Welfare, No. 77-1715 (U.S. filed Aug. 3, 1978). The essentially private nature of many of the
mental health facilities within the defendant class raises serious questions regarding the requi-
site "state action" to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 89 and
accompanying text infra.
40. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30,42 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (three-judge court) (emphasis added).
41. The mentally ill juveniles in the plaintiff class are under fourteen years old.
42. See notes 98-118 and accompanying text infra (constitutional significance of age in
determining the weight to be accorded a minor's liberty interests).
neous commitment43 and the "stigma"44 attached to institutionaliza-
tion demand that both groups be treated identically.45 Hence, the
district court again found the Pennsylvania institutionalization pro-
cedures unconstitutional and reaffirmed the necessity for substantial
due process protections.46
By balancing the conflicting public and private interests in-
volved in the institutionalization process, the Bartley court reached
the determination that due process requires affording minors a full
complement of safeguards. The starting point for an analysis of the
Bartley result, thus, is the individual examination of these interests.
III. Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interests Implicated In The
Admission Of Minors To Mental Institutions
A. Minor's Liberty Interest
Personal liberty both includes the right to be free from bodily
restraint47 and encompasses the protection of a person's good name
or reputation.48 Since minors are "persons" under the Constitution
they are entitled to these rights.49 As the Supreme Court has enunci-
ated, "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being mag-
ically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority."5
One of the most important rights that is derived from a person's
liberty interest is the right to be free from arbitrary state confine-
ment. This right has frequently been recognized in juvenile court
proceedings.5 In In re Gault,52 for example, a fifteen-year-old boy
was arrested for allegedly making lewd telephone calls. A hearing
was held before a juvenile court judge and the boy was adjudicated a
delinquent and committed to a state institution. 53 In reversing the
43. See notes 162-176 and accompanying text infra.
44. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text infra.
45. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 38-40 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (three-judge court) (emphasis added). The differences between the mentally ill and
the mentally retarded are beyond the scope of this comment. See generally Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-
1490 (3d Cir. April 13, 1978); Morse, Crazy Behavior Morals, and Science: An Anah'sis of
MentalHealth Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978).
46. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (three-judge court).
47. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
48. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
49. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
the Court held that minors possess first amendment rights within the school environment. The
Court stated that minors are "possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect
just as [the minors] must respect their obligations to the State." Id at 511.
50. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
51. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966), see also cases cited in note 54 infra.
52. Id
53. The minor's parents were not informed of their son's arrest and no formal notice was
adjudication, the United States Supreme Court noted that the partic-
ular procedures afforded were not constitutionally adequate to safe-
guard the liberty interests at stake.54 The Court rejected the notion
that juveniles do not possess liberty interests deserving of protection
because the purpose of juvenile court proceedings is to rehabilitate
rather than to punish the juveniles. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Jus-
tice Fortas observed,
The right of the state, as parenspatriae, to deny to the child
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the as-
sertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but
to custody." . . . On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles
were described as "civil" not "criminal" and therefore not subject
to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to de-
prive a person of his liberty.
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened im-
pulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law
in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical ba-
sis for this peculiar system is - to say the least - debatable. And
in practice . the results have not been entirely satisfactory. 55
The Gauli reasoning applies equally to juvenile institutionaliza-
tion proceedings; the state's benevolent motive of providing neces-
sary medical care to a minor is insufficient constitutional justification
for the state to ignore a minor's liberty interest in being free from
arbitrary state confinement.56
Institutionalization for mental illness entails, in addition to loss
of personal freedom, possible damage to the individual's reputa-
given to the parents about the juvenile court hearing the next day. At the hearing, the boy's
accuser did not testify, the witnesses were not sworn and a transcript of the hearing was not
made. Id. at 5.
54. The Court held that juveniles are entitled to (1) notice of the charges; (2) the right to
counsel and if indigent, the right to appointment of counsel; (3) the right to confront witnesses;
(4) the right to cross-examine witnesses; (5) and the right to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court specifically limited its holding to "proceedings by which a determi-
nation is made as to whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on
his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution." 387 U.S. at 13.
See also Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978) (double jeopardy attaches to an adjudicatory
master's hearing); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy attaches to juvenile
court proceedings); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial not required in
juvenile court proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable
doubt constitutionally required in juvenile court proceedings); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966) (juvenile courts do not have unbridled discretion in determining whether to enter-
tain jurisdiction over a particular case); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (coerced
confessions may not be introduced in juvenile court proceedings); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948) (same).
55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
56. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968), in which the court noted,
It matters not whether the proceedings be labelled "civil" or "criminal" or whether
the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood
of involuntary incarceration %-whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, reha-
bilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble minded
or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the constitutional safe-
guards of due process.
[d. at 396.
tion,57 which the Court has protected in other circumstances. In Goss
v. Lopez5 8 the Supreme Court held in the context of school suspen-
sions that minor school students have a protected liberty interest in
their reputation of which they cannot be deprived without due proc-
ess of law. The Court recognized the damage that such charges
would have on the students' reputation: "If sustained and recorded,
those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with
their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later
opportunities for higher education and employment."59 To protect
the students' liberty interests and satisfy due process requirements,
the Court ordered that the students be given notice of the charges
and an opportunity to present their version of the challenged activity
to the proper authorities.6 °
Extending constitutional protection of a juvenile's reputation to
institutionalization proceedings seems fitting. Although society in
general no longer views mental illness with the fear and disdain that
it once did,6 "[elven accepting recent medical advances, current
studies clearly indicate the fallacy of contending that most people
view mental illness as a disease similar to any physical ailment of the
body."'62 Furthermore, once the patient is discharged from the insti-
tution he "not only must cope with the stigma of having once been
hospitalized, but he must often continue to cope with the 'mental
illness' label itself."
63
That minors possess liberty interests in state proceedings that
can result in loss of personal freedom 64 or damage to reputation,
65
however, does not necessarily demonstrate the existence of similar
liberty interests when parents, who are already entitled to the mi-
nor's custody and control, initiate the proceedings to admit the mi-
nors to state mental health facilities. The answer is dependent upon
the existence and importance of parental liberty interests.
57. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court discusses the stigma that
may attach to the label of mental illness. Id at 668. See also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (discussion of the stigma that
may attach to mental retardation). See generally Panneton, Children, Commitment and Con-
sent: A Constitutional Crisis, 10 FAM. L.Q. 295 (1976).
58. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
59. Id at 575. The Court also held that the students had a property interest in their
education on the basis of applicable state law.
60. Id. at 583-84. For a recent Supreme Court decision clarifying Goss, see Board of
Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). See notes 172-75 and accompa-
nying text infra.
61. See Panneton supra note 57.
62. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
63. Id. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1966) (stigma attaches to adjudication of delin-
quency).
64. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
B Parents' Liberty Interest
The family unit is entitled to significant constitutional protec-
tion.6 6 Since parents are at the apex of the family relationship, they
are given great deference in decisions concerning the upbringing of
their children.67 The Supreme Court has consistently invalidated
state legislation unduly encroaching into the sphere of parental au-
thority.68 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters69 the Court invalidated an
Oregon statute that required all parents to send their children to
public school through the eighth grade. The Court clearly indicated
that parental decisions are cognizable within the liberty concept of
the fourteenth amendment:
[The Act] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control. . . . The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the hih duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down state
statutes for infringing on parental constitutional rights, 7' it has con-
sistently maintained that these rights are not absolute.7 2 A state has
an independent interest in protecting the health and welfare of its
66. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Cf
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (constitutional rights of foster
parents).
67. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court recognized that, "The history
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232.
68. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), was the first Supreme Court decision specifi-
cally finding parental autonomy protectable under the liberty provision of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court struck down a state statute that prohibited the teaching of any modern
language other than English in both private and public schools to any student who had not
completed the eighth grade. The Court held that the statute violated both the liberty interest of
teachers to engage in their chosen occupation and the liberty interest of parents to direct the
education of their children.
69. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
70. 268 U.S. at 534-35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), reaffirmed parental
liberty interests by declaring a state statute unconstitutional as it applied to Amish parents.
The statute required school attendance through the age of sixteen and subjected parents to
fines for not requiring their children to attend. The Court held that the statute invaded the
parents' liberty interests in controlling the religious upbringing of their children. The record
indicated that the parents refused to send their children to school beyond the age of fourteen
because of the interference the two additional years would have on the children's religious
upbringing, and the state provided no compelling justification for requiring two additional
years of school for Amish children.
71. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
72. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944),
youth and may restrict parental control if such action is essential to
achieve this objective. 73 In Prince v. Massachusetts74 the Supreme
Court upheld a state statute prohibiting minors from selling mer-
chandise in public places and prohibiting parents or guardians from
furnishing minors any articles for such sale. The Prince court found
that a guardian had violated this statute when she supplied a minor
in her custody with religious materials to sell on the street. The
Court recognized that, "neither rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general inter-
est in youth's well-being, the state asparenspatriae may restrict the
parents control [in many ways]." 75
Decisions like Pierce and Prince indicate the need to strike an
appropriate balance between the state's duty to protect the integrity
of the family and its independent duty to protect the health and wel-
fare of its youth. Since parental rights to custody and control of their
children are considered "fundamental, '76 state regulation encroach-
ing upon these rights can only be justified by a compelling state in-
terest.77 Furthermore, any regulation of parental custody and
control must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake78 or the regulation will be invalidated.7 9
This policy of favoring parental control and custody is evident
in the great respect that courts accord to parental medical decisions.
73. See, e.g., Sturges & B. Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913) (restriction of
child labor); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination).
74. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
75. Id at 166. Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (restriction of distribution
of obscene literature to minors upheld).
76. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
77. See id at 152-55; Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
78. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
79. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), is an example of a state's attempt to protect its
youth, which attempt failed because the particular statute was not drawn narrowly enough to
express only the legitimate state interests involved. The Court invalidated an Illinois law that
made the children of unwed fathers wards of the state upon the death of the mother. The state
did not recognize the father's right to custody of his children and took the children without
first determining his fitness as a parent. Illinois declared that the purpose of the statute was to
protect both the mental and physical welfare of the minor and the interests of the community
as a whole and, concurrently, to protect the minor's family relationships whenever possible.
Id at 652.
Finding that the state's interests were legitimate and well within its power to implement,
the Supreme Court, nevertheless, invalidated the statute because it not only deprived the father
of his fundamental liberty interest, but did not further the state's goals. The Court stated, "We
observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children
from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articu-
lated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family." Id at 652-53. See also
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (emergency taking of custody by the state
was proper but the state's refusal to return the children or to conduct a hearing to determine
the fitness of the mother was a deprivation of the mother's liberty interests without due process
of law).
Because traditionally these decisions have been one of the most im-
portant responsibilities entrusted to parents,80 courts are reluctant to
allow state interference even when the child's life is at stake. 81 In-
deed, states will normally intercede in medical decisions only when
the child's life is in serious jeopardy and the parents are determined
to be incompetent to safeguard the child's interests. 2
Similarly, treatment of a child's mental disorders has histori-
cally been recognized as a parental responsibility, and the state's role
has been to aid the parents in the discharge of this responsibility. 3
Hence, any state intervention in opposition to these parental deci-
sions about their child's mental health needs should require the same
justification that has traditionally been required in other medical ar-
eas.
84
80. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See also Bonnor v. Moran, 126
F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (fifteen-year-old child's consent to a medical procedure not a defense
to an assault and battery action). See generally, Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care
Decisionmaking Authority" A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VIRGINIA L. REV. 285 (1976);
Ellis, Volunteering Children- Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF.
L. REV. 840, 855 (1974).
81. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). In Quinlan a father sought legal
guardianship of his twenty-one-year old daughter who was in a "persistent vegetative state."
The father also requested judicial authority to give him the power to order discontinuance of
all extraordinary medical procedures sustaining his daughter's life. The father's request was
opposed by the daughter's doctors, the hospital, the State of New Jersey, and the daughter's
previously appointed guardian ad litem. The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed the father
as guardian with authority to discontinue treatment if the doctors agreed that his daughter had
no reasonable chance of improving. Recognizing the gravity of the decision, the court stated,
The litigation has to do, in final analysis, with her life-its continuance or cessa-
tion-and the responsibilities, rights and duties, with regard to any fateful decision
concerning it, of her family, her guardian, her doctors, the hospital, the State through
its law enforcement authorities, and finally the courts of justice.
70 N.J. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
82. See In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127
N.E.2d 820 (1955). But see Harley v. Oliver, 404 F. Supp. 450, 456 (W.D. Ark. 1975) ("A
parent or guardian of a minor has no legal right to deny proper medical treatment or treatment
recommended by the medical profession for any disease of a minor, even though such treat-
ment is contrary to a religious belief of the parent or guardian."); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d
658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), af'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971),
af'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). But cf. In re Application of
President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (medical treat-
ment ordered against adult's wishes). See generally, Bennett, supra note 80; Goldstein, Medical
Care for the Child at Risk. On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645
(1977).
83. See generally A. DEUTSCH, MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (1949); Panneton, supra note
57.
84. States may not constitutionally interfere with parental decisions without "compel-
ling" justification. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra. This compelling justification
is found only if "it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
234 (1972). Recently, several courts have held that the institutionalization of minors for mental
health treatment is an area providing compelling justification for state involvement in the insti-
tutionalization decision. See, e.g., J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-
judge court), prob. juris noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 298 (1977).
The Pennsylvania Legislature entrusts parents and psychiatrists
with the responsibility for determining whether children need mental
health treatment.85 The involvement of parents in the institutional-
ization process is constitutionally significant because it affects the na-
ture of the state's relationship to the child.86 Parental involvement,
however, does not extinguish a child's liberty interest, because the
state is still involved in the decision to institutionalize, which de-
prives the minor of personal freedom.87 Initially, courts look for the
existence of a particular liberty interest, rather than to the weight to
be afforded that interest, in determining whether due process re-
quirements apply to a given situation.88 The state's significant in-
volvement in the child's detention implicates the child's liberty
interests and, therefore, is sufficient to trigger fourteenth amendment
due process protections.89
IV. The Institutionalization Procedures-A Constitutional
Analysis
Since minors and parents have liberty interests in the admission
of a minor to a state mental institution, states must provide procedu-
ral protections that are constitutionally adequate to safeguard the in-
terests. Due process, however, is flexible and its requirements must
85. See notes 25-35 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 119-28 and accompanying text infra.
87. in re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
88. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
89. In Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (three-judge court), the district court held that minors have a liberty interest deserving of
constitutional protection when they are admitted by their parents to both public and private
mental health facilities in Pennsylvania. Decisions by the United States Supreme Court and
many other courts, however, clearly indicate that Pennsylvania is insufficiently involved in
private institutionalization to provide the necessary "state action" to implicate a minor's lib-
erty interests. Pennsylvania's only connection with private institutions is the licensing of the
facility. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4201(8), 7105 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1978). In In re
John S., - Cal. App. 3d -, 135 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1977), the court held that,
The decision to admit minor [to a private licensed mental health facility] was a pri-
vate one between parents, doctor, and hospital. The state in no way became a party
to this parental decision involving medical treatment for their minor child, anymore
than it would become party to a parental decision to send their child to a private
boarding school, to summer camp, or to his room.
- Cal. App. 3d at -, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 901. See also Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Madry v. Sorel, 558 F.2d 303
(5th Cir. 1977); Parks v. Ford, 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523
F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 948 (1976). Cf. Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976) (alleged discrimination in admission procedures of private
university; no state action); Fulton v. Hecht, 545 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1977) (alleged civil rights
violations by private kennel club; no state action). For a more detailed analysis of "state ac-
tion" as it relates to private mental health facilities in Pennsylvania, see Brief for Appellants at
47-52, Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, No. 77-1715 (U.S. filed Aug. 3,
1978).
be determined in light of the various interests involved.9" In the ju-
venile institutionalization process state interests must be considered
as well as the private interests of minors and their parents that have
been affected by state action.9'
States generally assert three independent interests in the institu-
tionalization of minors and argue that the introduction of more for-
malized procedures into the process will substantially interfere with
these interests.92 The states' interests are insuring the proper mental
health of children,93 preserving the family unit and maintaining pa-
rental authority over children,94 and protecting society from those
persons who pose significant danger to the community.95 These in-
terests along with the private interests involved must be safeguarded.
Courts, such as the Bartley court, that have recognized the right
of minors to substantial due process protections prior to being admit-
ted to a mental institution by their parents reason principally by
analogy to the protections that are afforded to adults in involuntary
civil commitment proceedings.96 The determination of whether the
Constitution requires that states afford both minors and adults the
identical due process protections in institutionalization proceedings
requires that the following additional factors be examined: the mag-
nitude of the minor's liberty interest in the commitment process; the
constitutional significance of parental involvement in the commit-
ment process; and the nature of the ultimate commitment decision.
A. The Magnitude of the Minor's Liberty Interest-A Function of
Maturity
Constitutional attacks against juvenile commitment procedures
are unusual because they involve children challenging the state's rec-
90. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
91. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
92. See, e.g., Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court).
Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (argument rejected in context of juvenile court proceed-
ings).
93. Protection of children's health has traditionally been recognized as a valid state inter-
est. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra. See generally Bennett, supra note 80.
94. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized that
states have a valid interest in protecting parental authority. The Court noted that "[tihe legis-
lature could properly conclude that parents. . . who have this primary responsibility for chil-
dren's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility." Id at 639.
95. Protection of society is a valid exercise of the state's police power and generally arises
in the context of adult confinements. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(three-judge court). For historical discussion of the state's interest in institutionalizing the
mentally ill, see Comment, Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 669
(1976).
96. See J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court), prob.
juris, noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (three-
judge court); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
ognition of parental authority rather than parents challenging the
state's interference with such authority.97 Thus, the minimum proce-
dures constitutionally adequate to protect the child's liberty interest
depend, to a large degree, on the magnitude of the child's interest at
stake.
Although a minor has a liberty interest entitled to due process
protection when the state is significantly involved in the minor's de-
tention, the liberty interest of a minor is not coextensive with that of
an adult.9" The " 'power of the state to control the conduct of chil-
dren reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults,' "" and
therefore, due process protections in juvenile institutionalization
proceedings need not be identical with those accorded adults.
Courts have difficulty defining the extent of a minor's liberty interest,
but opinions tend to focus upon maturity as a valid criterion for ana-
lyzing the scope of a minor's interests.t°°
In a leading decision discussing minors' rights in terms of ma-
turity, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, I'~ the Supreme Court invali-
dated a state statute that required an unmarried woman under
eighteen to get parental consent before obtaining an abortion. The
Court held that any independent interest the parent may have in ter-
minating the minor daughter's pregnancy is entitled to no greater
weight than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant. 0 2 In delivering the Court's opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Blackmun remarked,
We emphasize that our holding that [the section of the stat-
ute] is invalid does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age
or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy. The fault with [the section] is that it imposes a special
consent provision, exercisable by a person other than the woman
and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of
her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient justification for the
restriction. 10
97. The majority of Supreme Court decisions discussing the constitutional recognition of
family relationships involve parental attacks against state interference with parental authority.
See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). But see
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
98. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (curtailment of school students' rights
to freedom of expression); Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (cur-
few against minors being on the streets during certain hours upheld).
99. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968), quoting, Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
100. See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights' 1976 B.Y. L. REV. 605, 646-49.
101. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
102. Id at 75.
103. 1d (Citation omitted). The state argued that the consent provision was justified by
Danforth clearly indicates that the weight to be accorded a minor's
particular liberty interest is influenced to a large degree by the ma-
turity of the minor and the maturity required to assert intelligently
the particular interest. In this respect, Danforth follows the Supreme
Court's historical trend of considering the minor's maturity as a sig-
nificant factor in the determination whether states may curtail the
exercise of specific individual rights.' °4
Minors at early stages in their development are not intellectu-
ally competent to appreciate the ramifications of engaging in certain
behavior. At these early stages in the minor's development states
must entrust important decisions affecting the minor's health and
welfare to the child's parents. Consequently, as the minor's level of
maturity increases, the state's corresponding authority over the mi-
nor decreases.'0 5
1. Age-A Constitutional Measure of Maturity.- Although the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of children, 106
this interest must be balanced against a minor's right to be free from
state interference with the exercise of his constitutional rights. Since
maturity is a key factor in the constitutional balance, legislatures
must adopt guidelines to measure maturity. For legislative purposes
age is the most reasonable guideline.' 07 In Oregon v. Mitchell °8 the
Supreme Court upheld Congress' power to set the voting age in na-
tional elections at eighteen; although the Court acknowledged that
the right to vote is among the most fundamental rights enjoyed by
the state's interest in safeguarding the family unit and protecting parental authority. In re-
jecting this argument, the Court observed,
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power to
overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to terminate
the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely
that such veto power will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and
the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of
the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure.
Id at 75. Compare Danforth to Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), in which
the court enjoined several state agencies from distributing contraceptives to unemancipated
minors without notifying or receiving consent from the minors' parents. The court held that,
even in light of Danforth, state involvement in this area violated parent's constitutional rights:
"[Elven if there is a fundamental civil right among minors to obtain prescriptive contracep-
tives, that right need not exist to the total exclusion of any rights of the child's parents." Id at
1254.
104. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (voting); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (access to reading materials); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
105. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). The
court held that the state must recognize the liberty interests of minors fourteen or older and
provide substantial due process protection before allowing parents to institutionalize children
above this age. The court, however, specifically refused to determine whether minors below
fourteen have similar liberty interests that the state must protect. See generally Engdahl, Con-
stitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 34-38 (1970).
106. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
108. Id
citizens in a democracy, it held that legislatures have the responsibil-
ity to determine at what age citizens are intellectually mature enough
to exercise this right. 109
Legislatures must examine particular constitutional rights and
determine at what age the minor's level of maturity is such that his
right outweighs the state's interest in protecting the minor's welfare.
In evaluating this legislative judgment, courts "do not demand of
legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria of legislation.' "" More-
over, courts should not second guess legislative determinations about
the age at which minors are competent to make certain decisions or
engage in particular activities."' Rather, courts should sustain the
legislative judgment provided that it is supported by substantial evi-
dence. "'
2. The Pennsylvania Measurement of Maturity-Fourteen Years
Old-States have traditionally entrusted parents and physicians
with making medical decisions in the best interests of children." 3
The Pennsylvania Legislature has determined that minors below the
age of fourteen are not competent to be entrusted with decisions con-
cerning the appropriateness of mental health treatment." 4 Further-
more, the legislature has concluded that minors below this age will
be adversely affected if subjected to adversary proceedings in the in-
stitutionalization process.' '5 Substantial evidence supports the legis-
lature's judgment that more formalized admission procedures are
detrimental to the child's well-being." 6 Convincing evidence to the
contrary also exists.' '" Legislatures, rather than courts, should eval-
uate the conflicting evidence of the differing psychological ramifica-
109. Mr. Justice Douglas acknowledged,
It is said, why draw the line at 18? Why not 17? Congress can draw lines and I see
no reason why it cannot conclude that 18-year-olds have that degree of maturity
which entitles them to the franchise. They are "generally considered by American
law to be mature enough to contract, to marry, to drive an automobile, to own a gun,
and to be responsible for criminal behavior as an adult."
Id. at 142 (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Engdahl, supra note 105 at 36).
110. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968) (quoting Noble State Bank v. Has-
kell, 219 U.S. 104, 110(1911)).
111. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
112. Id
113. See notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra.
114. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1978).
115. See Brief for Appellants at 35-36, Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub.
Welfare, No. 77-1715 (U.S. filed Aug. 3, 1978).
116. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 852 n.59 (1977). See
generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973); Hafen, supra note 100, at 651-56.
117. See Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 45
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (three-judge court). Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1966) (due process protec-
tions may be therapeutic rather than detrimental in juvenile court proceedings). See also
Comment, Due Process Limitations on Parental Rights to Commit Children to Mental Institu-
tions, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 235, 256-57 (1977).
tions that may occur with various age levels and institutionalization
procedures and devise the system that will best serve the child's in-
terests. ' 1
8
B. The Constitutional Significance of Parental Involvement in the
Institutionalization Process
1. Parental Involvement Alters the Nature of the State's Involve-
ment in the Institutionalization Process. -Parental involvement in the
institutionalization process cannot be ignored. Under the Penn-
sylvania mental health scheme parents must initiate the commitment
process and consent at all times thereafter to their child's continued
hospitalization. 9 The parents involvement in the child's hospitali-
zation is significant because "parents . . . have powers greater than
that of the state to curtail a child's exercise of the constitutional
rights he may otherwise enjoy, for a parent's own constitutionally
protected 'liberty' includes the right to . . . 'direct the upbringing
and education of children.' "120
Courts that have analyzed the constitutionality of juvenile ad-
mission statutes have determined correctly that parental involvement
in the institutionalization decision does not abrogate the state's re-
sponsibility to provide due process protections to safeguard the
child's liberty interests.' 2 ' Nevertheless, many of these courts failed
118. In Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), the court of appeals admonished
the district court for engaging in such judicial legislating. The court stated,
In determining the constitutionality of restrictions on student expression . . . it
is not the function of the courts to reevaluate the wisdom of state officials charged
with protecting the health and welfare of public school students. The inquiry of the
district court should have been limited to determining whether defendants had
demonstrated a substantial basis for their conclusion that distribution of the ques-
tionnaire would result in significant harm to some . . . students.
. . . Although psychological diagnoses of the type involved here are by their nature
difficult of precision . . . a federal court ought not impose its own views in such
matters where there is a rational basis for the decisions and actions of the school
authorities.
Id at 519.
The state's determination that an adversary institutionalization process will deter parents
from obtaining psychiatric care for their child should also be given significant weight when the
admission procedures are subjected to judicial scrutiny. In devising admission procedures for
young children, state legislatures must consider the potential effect on the parents because
"[tihe state has an interest in seeing that a procedural system will not deter parents, already
faced with this difficult decision, from attempting to institutionalize children who are in need
of treatment only mental institutions can provide." Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039,
1049 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court).
It is possible that neither the parent nor the child will benefit from the introduction of
adversary proceedings into the institutionalization process. The Bariley court, however, sub-
stituted its own views for those of the legislature in fashioning new admission procedures. See
402 F. Supp. at 1058 (Broderick, J., dissenting).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7201, 7206 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1978).
120. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 928, 569 P.2d 1286, 1290, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302
(1977) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
121. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra.
to consider that parental participation significantly altered the "pre-
cise nature of the government function involved"' 2 2 in the minor's
hospitalization, which affects the particular fourteenth amendment
protections required.
Many courts also have mistakenly analogized juvenile institu-
tionalization proceedings to juvenile court proceedings and then in-
terpreted the Constitution to require almost identical protections for
both, This approach shows a failure by the courts to appreciate the
different nature of the relationships in the two areas. 23 In the ad-
mission of minors to mental institutions the state makes its facilities
available to aid parents in obtaining medical treatment for their
child. 124 Since the parents initiate the process and the state's role is
merely to provide treatment to the child, the state does not stand in
an adversarial relationship to the child. The relationship between
the minor and the state in juvenile court proceedings, however, is
necessarily much more adversarial than in institutionalization pro-
ceedings, since the state accuses the juvenile of engaging in behavior
that would constitute a crime if performed by an adult. As the rela-
tionship between the state and the individual becomes more adver-
sarial, the fourteenth amendment requires the state to provide
increasing due process protections to safeguard the private interests
affected by governmental action. 125 Thus, because the relationships
are less adversarial in juvenile institutionalizations than juvenile
court proceedings, states may satisfy the fourteenth amendment by
providing less extensive procedural protections.
The state's posture in the juvenile institutionalization area is
also significantly different than in juvenile court proceedings and
other situations in which the state stands against both parent and
child. The Supreme Court has held that minors are entitled to sub-
stantial due process safeguards prior to an adjudication of delin-
quency in juvenile court proceedings.' 26  In Gault the Court was
careful to point out that the due process protections are necessary
there not only to protect the rights of the child, but to protect the
parent's liberty interests from state invasion by removal of the child
122. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (quoting McElroy v. Cafeteria & Res-
taurant Union Workers, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
123. Compare text accompanying note 21 with note 54 supra.
124. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
125. See Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (teacher-
student relationship); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student-disciplinarian relationship);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (employer-employee relationship); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole officer-parolee relationship); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972) (debtor-creditor relationship); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (motor vehicle
department-driver relationship); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare administra-
tor-recipient relationship).
126. See note 54 supra.
from the family environment to face accusations of engaging in ille-
gal activities. 27
By admitting minors to mental hospitals on the initiation of
their parents, the state is not invading the protected liberty of par-
ents, but, on the contrary, is supporting parental rights to control the
proper development of their children. The minor's liberty interest is
also protected by the parent's continued participation in the institu-
tionalization process. The parent stands between the child and the
state as an added assurance that the state will detain the minor no
longer than necessary to complete the medical treatment. 28 Since
both the parents' and the child's interests are protected to some de-
gree by parental involvement in the hospitalization decision, due
process does not require the extensive protections that are mandated
in juvenile court proceedings.
2. Parent- Child Conflict-An Unconstitutional Presumption. -
The Bartley court predicated its finding that parental involvement in
the institutionalization process is insufficient to reduce the due proc-
ess protections necessary to safeguard the child's liberty interest
upon the possibility of a conflict of interest between parent and
child.'29 Courts have often intruded upon parental authority in deci-
sions concerning child rearing when it has been shown that the
child's welfare is in jeopardy because of some neglect or irresponsi-
bility on the part of the parents. 30 These cases involved situations of
express conflict between parent and child, which generally arise
when parents refuse to consent to necessary medical care for their
children.' 3 ' The Bartley court went a step further and presumed pa-
rental incompetence even when parents follow medical advice by ob-
taining medical treatment for their children.
Since parents have the primary responsibility for raising chil-
dren, the law presumes that parents act in their child's best intei-
ests. 132 The Bartley court acknowledged this presumption when it
stated, "We presume that in most instances parents, proceeding in
127. The Supreme Court observed that due process "does not allow a hearing to be held in
which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his custody are at stake without giving them
timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet." 387 U.S. I,
33-34 (emphasis added).
128. But see Ellis, supra note 80, at 851-52. Ellis suggests that parents under some circum-
stances may resort to committing their children "in order to sanction behavior of which they
disapproved." The author then points out that independent expert counseling might mitigate
this problem. Pennsylvania's mental health scheme mandates continued psychiatric evalua-
tions to reduce the risk of such erroneous institutionalization. See notes 31-35 and accompa-
nying text supra.
129. 402 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
130. See generally Bennett, supra note 80, at 302.
131. See Goldstein, supra note 82, at 651-61.
132. See id at 648-49.
utmost good faith . . . in the child's best interests, properly guide,
protect, and control their children."' 33 The court then properly rec-
ognized that there are isolated instances in which parents do not act
in their child's best interests. The court referred to the "graphic ex-
ample [of] parental child abuse" 134 as evidence of a parent-child con-
flict of interest. Analogizing from these isolated instances, the court
created a presumption that a conflict of interest occurs between par-
ent and child when a parent, acting upon medical recommendation,
seeks to admit his child to a mental institution.
35
Furthermore, for a valid disagreement between the parent's
wishes and the child's wishes to be present, the child must be mature
enough to assert an informed opinion about the proposed parental
action. 136 Many of the children afforded substantial due process pro-
tections by Bartley are not mature enough to form any opinions
about the propriety of proposed medical treatment.
137
The Supreme Court, in its remand opinion, recognized that
careful attention must be given to the differences between young and
very young juveniles. 38  These differences are significant in deter-
mining whether a parent-child conflict actually exists. On remand
the district court bypassed the need to determine critically whether
parents are incompetent to represent their child's interests, by
presuming in law what could not be inferred from fact.
The Supreme Court has warned against creating presumptions
that seriously impair the exercise of parental liberty interests. 13  In
Stanley v. Illinois"'° the Court invalidated a statute that created a
133. 402 F. Supp. at 1047.
134. Id
135. Since no conflict of interest is presumed when parents seek other types of medical
treatment for their children, the Bartley court found it necessary to distinguish psychiatric
treatment from treatment of other medical conditions. The court stated that "[u]nlike other
kinds of medical treatment, a substantial stigma attaches to institutionalization. This stigma
coupled with the substantial danger of error in [diagnoses,] and the greater potential for long-
term loss of liberty create a situation substantially different from the treatment of other medi-
cal conditions." Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 43
(E.D. Pa. 1978). At oral argument Mr. Justice Rehnquist observed that much of these alleged
differences break down when parents make life-or-death medical decisions for their children.
136. Cf. In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (sixteen-year-old held mature
enough to be consulted regarding proposed medical treatment). But cf. Bonner v. Moran, 126
F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (fifteen-year-old held not competent to consent to medical opera-
tion).
137. As observed in appellant's brief, "It strains the imagination to conceive of a ten-year
old child able to decide for himself or herself the wisdom of a psychiatric admission any more
than of an appendectomy or a blood transfusion:" Brief for Appellants at 32, Institutionalized
Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, No. 77-1715 (U.S. filed Aug. 3, 1978) (quoting Eisen-
berg, An Epidemic of Kew Gardens Syndrome. The Redenition of Caring as Coercion, Interna-
tional Symposium of the Thist/etown Regional Center (September 1977) (to be published in
New Directions of Children's Mental Health, Spectrum Publications 1978).
138. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 135 (1977).
139. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
140. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
presumption that unwed fathers are unfit to care for their children
upon the mother's death. Although the principal defect in the statute
was its failure to require a hearing to prove the father's unfitness as a
parent, the Court's general disdain for presumptions that invade pa-
rental constitutional rights is apparent:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when
it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formali-
ties, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important in-
terests of both parent and child.' 4
The Pennsylvania Legislature avoided creating a presumption
that parents are not acting in their child's best interests when admit-
ting their child for inpatient psychiatric care. ' 42 The legislature ade-
quately protected against the possibility that a small percentage of
parents may attempt institutionalization for improper motives by re-
quiring independent psychiatric review of the initial commitment
decision 43 and continuing psychiatric review of the child's need for
141. Id at 656-57. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court re-
jected Wisconsin's argument that allowing Amish parents to withdraw their children from
school at age fourteen rather than age sixteen would infringe upon the child's right to secon-
dary education. The Court concluded,
The State's argument proceeds without reliance on any actual conflict between
the wishes of the parents and children. It appears to rest on the potential that exemp-
tion of Amish parents from the requirements of the compulsory-education law might
allow some parents to act contrary to the best interests of their children by foreclosing
their opportunity to make an intelligent choice between the Amish way of life and
that of the outside world.
Indeed it seems clear that if the State is empowered, as parenspairiae, to "save"
a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring an additional two years of
compulsory formal high school education, the State will in large measure influence, if
not determine, the religious future of the child.
Id at 232. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969). In Tinker the Supreme Court reversed a district court decision that a school district
could forbid the wearing of armbands in protest of the Vietnam War because of the school
district's fear that the armbands might create a disturbance in the school environment. The
Court emphasized that "in our system undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id at 508.
142. In essence, the Bartley court has ordered Pennsylvania to intervene in parental deci-
sions because of a mere potential conflict of interest between parent and child. The Supreme
Court, however, has indicated that such state interference would be constitutionally suspect
even though an express conflict existed between parent and child. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the Supreme Court expressed grave doubts whether the Consti-
tution would permit states to interfere with parental rights when children expressed a desire to
continue their high school attendance in opposition to their parent's wishes. The Court stated,
Recognition of the claim of the State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into
question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and
education of their minor children recognized in this Court's past decisions. It is clear
that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of religious training
would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom comparable to those raised
here and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). On this
record we neither reach nor decide those issues.
Id at 231.
143. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
further hospitalization.'" Although the Bartley court realized that
few parents institutionalize their children for improper motives, 4 5
the court, nevertheless, devised procedures in an attempt to protect
those few minors without realizing that the procedures would do
damage to all.'
4 6
C. The Commitment Decision
1. The Constitutional Standard-The Supreme Court has spe-
cifically refused to afford minors the same constitutional rights as
adults merely because of the state's presence in the challenged activ-
ity. "' The Bartley court, however, examined the due process protec-
tions afforded to adults in involuntary commitment proceedings ,48
and then transferred those protections to juveniles in institutionaliza-
tion proceedings.'49 In doing so, the court failed to appreciate the
144. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
145. The court recognized that, "A decision to institutionalize a child is often a difficult
yet necessary decision for a child's parent to make. It is generally pursued only after all other
alternatives have proven futile." 402 F. Supp. at 1049.
146. That a number of parents do abuse their children and may wish to be rid of
them at all costs does not contravene the correctness of assuming good will as the
starting point. The new doctrine stands the world on its head. In the effort to prevent
the violation of some, it does violence to all.
Brief for Appellants at 38, Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, No. 77-
1715 (U.S. filed Aug. 3, 1978) (quoting Eisenberg, supra note 137).
147. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
148. 402 F. Supp. at 1045-46.
149. An adult subject to involuntary civil commitment on the ground of mental illness is
entitled to substantial due process protections before the state can deprive him of his four-
teenth amendment liberty interest in freedom from state confinement. See Bell v. Wayne
County, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974), cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(revocation of parole without providing informal hearing violates fourteenth amendment due
process). These protections include the right to a judicial hearing. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court). Moreover, notice of the hearing must be given
"sufficiently in advance.., so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded." Id. at
388 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967)). The right to counsel extends to all significant
stages of the commitment process, Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968); Bell
v. Wayne County, 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1093 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney Gen. of
Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971), but not to preliminary information-
gathering stages such as psychiatric interviews because "the presence of counsel . . . might
unduly interfere with the objective evaluation of the patient's mental condition." Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 n.5 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court).
Adult commitment proceedings are governed by the same rules of evidence applicable to
other judicial proceedings, and the subject of the involuntary commitment has both the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying in favor of commitment, as well as the right to
offer evidence in his own behalf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1966); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E. D.Wis. 1974), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975). Courts differ, however, on the standard
of proof required in civil commitment proceedings. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (beyond a reasonable doubt); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-
judge court) (clear, unequivocal, and convincing).
Compare the rights afforded adults in the involuntary commitment process with text ac-
companying note 21 supra (rights afforded minors by Bartley court).
differing constitutional standards applicable to the commitment of
juveniles and adults.
In O'Connor v. Donaldson'50 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed adult civil commitments and held that a finding of mental
illness alone does not provide sufficient constitutional justification
for the state's involuntary confinement of an adult.' I The four-
teenth amendment requires an additional showing that the adult is
dangerous to himself or others.'
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's
locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely
in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that the term can be
iven a reasonably precise content and that the "mentally ill" can
e identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitu-
tional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.'
53
The adult's confinement determination, therefore, requires both a
medical diagnosis of mental illness and a "social and legal judgment
that [the adult's] potential for doing harm, to himself or others, is
great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty."'
154
The judicial process in the adult commitment decision protects the
determination of whether an adult's mental illness poses a significant
danger to the welfare of the individual or society. -5 Discussing the
need for more than medical input into the adult commitment deci-
sion, the Supreme Court observed that in "making this determina-
tion, the jury serves the critical function of introducing into the
150. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
151. The plaintiff, Donaldson, had been committed to a state mental institution upon a
state court's conclusion that he was suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia." The evidence at
trial indicated that Donaldson was not dangerous at anytime during his confinement and had
not received treatment for his alleged illness. The Court specifically refused to decide whether
mentally ill persons, dangerous to themselves or others, have a constitutional right to treatment
upon involuntary confinement by the state, or whether nondangerous, mentally ill adults may
be involuntarily confined for the purpose of treatment. Id at 573. The court of appeals held
that "a person involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has a constitutional
right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured
or to improve his mental condition." Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir.
1974).
152. Some jurisdictions require that the "dangerousness" element must be evidenced by a
recent act. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
153. 422 U.S. at 575. The Court further held that even if the initial commitment was
founded upon an adequate constitutional basis, confinement could not constitutionally con-
tinue after the basis no longer existed. Id. Cf Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (deaf
mute, accused of robbery, was committed because of his mental incapacity to stand trial). The
Court held that such commitment was constitutionally valid only if a substantial likelihood
existed that he would regain sufficient capacity to stand trial within a reasonable time. Other-
wise, confinement must be justified by the same standards underlying other civil commitments.
154. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). Although the Donaldson court limited
its holding to custodial confinement, other courts have indicated that a nondangerous, men-
tally ill adult cannot be involuntarily confined even for treatment purposes. See, e.g., Stamus
v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D.
Haw. 1976); Bell v. Wayne County, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
155. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in the com-
munity, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify the State
in confining a person for compulsory treatment."'
5 6
The constitutional standard applicable to commitment of mi-
nors to state mental health facilities does not encompass the "social
and legal" judgments of dangerousness underlying adult commit-
ments. Findings of mental illness and the propriety of institutional
treatment are the only determinations that must be made.'57 These
decisions are medical rather than legal. 1
58
Recently the California Supreme Court rejected an argument
that minors must meet the adult standard of "dangerous to them-
selves or others" before institutionalization can be constitutionally
permissible. 59 After examining an adult's and a minor's liberty in-
terests to determine whether the fourteenth amendment required
identical standards in both adult and juvenile commitments, the
court concluded that nondangerous minors are not denied equal pro-
tection when institutionalized by their parents for mental health
treatment. 60  The court's holding derives ample support from
United States Supreme Court decisions indicating that maturity is a
significant factor in assessing the magnitude of minors' constitutional
rights.' 6 1 Since the institutionalization decision is predicated on a
finding that the minor is mentally ill and will benefit from inpatient
psychiatric treatment, it must be determined whether the judiciary or
the medical profession should be entrusted with this decision.
2. The Diagnosis-A Question of Law or Mediine?-The
156. Id
157. Inre Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). The Bartley
court realized the essentially medical nature of the commitment decision when it discussed the
issues to be considered at the newly mandated hearings. The tribunal is to determine first,
whether the child is mentally ill; second, whether commitment is necessary and will be benefi-
cial to the child; and third, whether commitment is the least restrictive alternative. Institution-
alized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 45 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also J.
L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court), prob.juris noted, 431 U.S.
936 (1977).
158. Cf Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (academic
achievement is an educational rather than legal determination). See generally Goldstein, supra
note 82; Roth, Some Comments on Labeling, 3 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L. I (1975).
159. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977) (commitment
of minors fourteen or older to state mental institutions).
160. The liberty interest of an adult may sufficiently outweigh the state's interest in
promoting optimal mental health that a state may not confine a nondangerous adult
solely for the purpose of treating that person's mental illness. . . . It does not follow,
however, that a nondangerous minor is denied equal protection if his parent is per-
mitted to obtain treatment for the minor's mental illness or disorder by such place-
ment for "the Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same."
Id at 19 Cal. 3d 933-34, 569 P.2d 1293-94, 141 Cal. Rptr. 305-06 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310
U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
161. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Bartley court justified the introduction of additional due process
protections in the juvenile institutionalization area as a necessity to
guard against an erroneous diagnosis of mental illness. 162  Courts
generally refuse to intervene in medical diagnoses in other areas of
medicine; 163 therefore, intervention in the area of psychiatric diagno-
sis requires substantial justification. 64
The argument continually advanced in support of judicial inter-
vention in the diagnosis of mental illness is that psychiatry is an in-
exact science subject to greater errors in diagnosis than other areas of
medicine.' 65  Differences of opinion among psychiatrists about the
necessity of mental health treatment, however, should not render the
psychiatric profession incompetent to be entrusted with that medical
determination. ' 66 The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, 167 indicated
that professional disagreement in other areas of medicine did not
render the physician incompetent to be entrusted with the medical
decisions. Similarly, in Doe v. Bolton'68 the Court invalidated a
Georgia statute requiring a physician to have his clinical judgment
confirmed by two other physicians prior to performing an abortion.
The Court noted that licensing by the state is ample recognition of
the physician's ability to exercise the necessary professional judg-
ment and found no reason to depart from the historical deference
162. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30,43 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
163. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See generally Goldstein, supra
note 82 at 651-59.
164. See generally Roth supra note 158.
165. See, e.g., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary Of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30,43
(E.D. Pa. 1978); J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1976), prob. juris noted, 431
U.S. 936 (1977); Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973). But see
Roth, supra note 158 at 123-31.
166. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 942, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 311
(1977) (Clark, J., dissenting), wherein Mr. Justice Clark recognizes,
When a case is heard by the superior court, Court of Appeals, this court and the
United States Supreme Court, the 20 judges may be evenly divided on the applicable
principles of law. But that would not demonstrate their incompetence. The judicial
robe is not a magic cloak. It should be obvious-but apparently it is not-that
neither judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychia-
trists to render psychiatric judgments.
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court recognized the sensitive and emotional nature of the
abortion controversy and the existence of vigorous opposing views even among physicians
with respect to the abortion decision. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated a Texas criminal
statute that proscribed abortions except when medically necessary to save the mother's life.
The Court stated,
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state inter-
ests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to thosepoints, the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic re-
sponsibilityfor it must rest with thephysician. If an individual practitioner abuses the
privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and in-
tra-professional, are available.
Id at 165-66 (emphasis added).
168. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
paid to the medical profession.' 69 In delivering the Court's opinion,
Mr. Justice Blackmun stated,
The attending physician will know when a consultation is advisa-
ble - the doubtful situation, the need for assurance when the
medical decision is a delicate one, and the like. Physicians have
followed this routine historically and know its usefulness and ben-
efit for all concerned. It is still true today that "[r]eliance must be
placed upon the assurance given by his license, issued by an au-
thority competent to judge in that respect, that he [the physician]
possesses the requisite qualifications."
' 7
0
If psychiatry is more subjective than other areas of medicine,
courts should be even more reluctant to intervene in psychiatric di-
agnoses. 17 1 In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v.
Horowitz 72 the Supreme Court held that a medical student dis-
missed for academic reasons is not denied fourteenth amendment
due process by denial of a hearing to challenge the propriety of the
dismissal. The Court recognized the severity of the deprivation of
liberty involved in the dismissal, but, nevertheless, held that the
"evaluative nature of the inquiry and the significant and historically
supported interest of the school in preserving its present framework
for academic evaluations"' 73 weighed heavily against judicial inter-
vention into the process. Thus, the inherently subjective nature of
academic evaluation and the inappropriateness of judicial or admin-
istrative decisionmaking for making academic evaluations signifi-
cantly influenced the Court's decision.
174
169. Id
170. Id, at 199-200 (quoting, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889)). But cf.
J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three-judge court), prob. juris noted,431
U.S. 936 (1977). In Parham the district court rejected the argument that the issuance of a
license by the state to practice psychiatry assures that the psychiatrist is competent to make
professional judgments regarding his patient's mental condition. The court noted.
To suggest, as we do here, that psychiatrists are not infallible is not an indictment of
psychiatry. It is simply to say that psychiatrists like all humans are capable of erring.
Since they are capable of erring, psychiatrists like parents cannot statutorily be given
the power to confine a child in a mental hospital without procedural safeguards being
imposed to guard against errors in judgment and/or the arbitrariness that the best of
humans exhibit from time to time.
Id at 138.
171. See Brief for Appellants at 43 n.32, Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub.
Welfare, No 77-1715 (U.S. filed Aug. 3, 1978), wherein Pennsylvania notes that "[i]f psychiat-
ric diagnoses are neither reliable nor valid . . . then of course court room predictions and
courtroom diagnoses should cease immediately." (quoting, Roth, supra note 158 at 128).
172. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
173. Id at 86 n.3. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (public education is
generally committed to state and local authorities, and courts should be hesitant to intervene).
174. 435 U.S. at 90. The Court was careful to distinguish academic evaluations from the
disciplinary determinations that were held in Goss to require minimal due process in the deci-
sionmaking process. Rejecting judicial interference in academic evaluations, the Supreme
Court emphasized,
Such a judgment is by its very nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical
factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of
an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determi-
nation whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evalua-
The Supreme Court's refusal to undermine the authority of edu-
cators in making academic determinations indicates that judicial in-
tervention in the field of psychiatric diagnoses should also be
opposed. Psychiatric determinations, like academic evaluations, re-
quire "expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not
readily adaptable to the procedural tools of judicial or administra-
tive decisionmaking."'
17 5
Of even greater consequence, the introduction of adversary pro-
cedures into relationships that are not by nature adversarial can
serve only to weaken those relationships and do harm to the very
children the procedures are intended to protect. 7 6  The present
Pennsylvania procedures afford children constitutionally adequate
protection against erroneous institutionalization and, at the same
time, minimize the trauma of those children in need of hospitaliza-
tion.
V. Conclusion
Juvenile institutionalization is a subject that is both emotional
and fraught with difficult constitutional considerations. States, acting
to aid parents in providing necessary medical treatment for children,
must respect the constitutional rights of both parent and child. Ac-
cordingly, the institutionalization procedures must remain flexible
enough to provide mentally ill children easy access to treatment, and
rigid enough to prevent erroneous commitment of children not men-
tally ill.
Responding to constitutional deficiencies of past legislation, the
Pennsylvania Legislature has achieved within its newly enacted
tion of cumulative information and is not readily adaptable to the procedural tools of
judicial or administrative decisionmaking.
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgment of educa-
tors and thereby formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing.
The educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a con-
tinuing relationship between faculty and students.
Id.
175. Id Studies indicate that judicial proceedings tend to be merely ratification proce-
dures because judges rarely disagree with expert psychiatric diagnoses. See Hiday, Reformed
Committment Procedures.- An Empirical Study in the Courtroom, II LAW Soc'y REV. 651
(1976); Monahan, Empirical Analyses of Civil Commitment: Critique and Context, II LAW
Soc'y REv. 619 (1977). The inability of the judiciary to render medical determinations op-
poses such intervention in the field of psychiatric diagnoses. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976).
ITIhe specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, f any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; andfnally,
the Government's interest, inclung the function involved and the fscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id at 335 (emphasis added).
176. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
mental health scheme an adequate balance between the interests in-
volved in juvenile institutionalization. The procedures protect a par-
ent's liberty interests by allowing continuous parental input in the
hospitalization decision and, simultaneously, protect a child's liberty
interests by requiring constant psychiatric review of the child's
mental condition. The judicial extension of adult due process pro-
tection into juvenile institutionalization procedures disrupts the deli-
cate balance of the interests involved, and does so without sufficient
constitutional justification.
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